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Abstract: Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as the 
collapse of the communist regimes in the wider Eastern European and former USSR 
area, almost all of the respective states, looked upon the European Union as the 
only  way  of  survival  of  their  economies  and  their  fragile  democratic  systems.  
The EU responded in different ways which can be categorized as follows:  
a.  It  incorporated  the  majority  of  the  Eastern  European  States,  through  the 
enlargement  process  (Poland, Czech  Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, Romania) and has entered into accession negotiations with others 
(Croatia, Turkey). 
b.  It  initiated  bilateral  relations  with  the  Russian  Federation  as  an  important 
partner. 
c.  It developed the ENP and more recently the EaP to institutionalize a process of 
enhanced economic and political cooperation with the respective states aiming 
at bringing them closer to the EU, while preparing some of them for future 
membership, but also offering an alternative solution to certain states that the 
EU  is  not  willing  to  offer  full  membership  (Belarus,  Moldova,  Ukraine, 
Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan). 
d.  It  formulated  the  Stabilization  and  Association  Process  (SAP)  specifically 
designed  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  Western  Balkan  states  and  gradually 
incorporate them. 
The paper explores the institutional and political framework of the abovementioned 
developments, the potential outcome for the Balkan and eastern European states and 
the problematic aspects for the EU and the other parties involved.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Since Turkey submitted an application to join the European Union and it subsequently 
entered into accession negotiations with the EU, there is an ongoing discussion on whether 
Turkey is a European country, where Europe ends, where the  geographical and historical 
borders of Europe lie.  
However, before any of these questions needs to be answered, there is a number of 
States that no one disputes their European identity, both geographically and historically, that 
remained outside the consecutive enlargement processes and, most of them, strive to become 
the future EU members. 
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The article will analyze the European Aspirations of these States vis-à-vis the EU 
itself, the respective attitude of the EU and whether the processes followed by the EU present 
a genuine interest to incorporate some of these states or they merely constitute the maximum 
amount of cooperation the EU is willing to grant them. 
1.  THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
There can be no doubt that the most dramatic geopolitical events that marked the 
recent European History were the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist regimes on 
one hand and the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia on the other hand, which resulted in a 
drastic change of the geographic landscape of the larger European Area with the creation of 
15 new States in the former Soviet territory, 6 new States in the  former Yugoslavia and 
several secessionist movements in some of the newly created states.
2  
During the same period, the leaders of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
decided to undertake a very ambitious step towards the European Integration: To transform 
their economic cooperation into a predominantly political one, through the creation of the 
European Union, which materialized in 1992 by the signature of the Treaty of Maastricht and 
the subsequent Treaties that developed the institutional and operational framework of the EU. 
Almost all of these new States sought closer relations with the EU and eventually most 
of them expressed their will to join the EU, viewing it as their only option in economic –
mainly – and political terms. The outcome of this process, since the EU-15 decided to remain 
open  to  new  memberships,  culminated  in  the  biggest  enlargement  in  the  history  of  the 
European integration with the accession of 10 new members in 2004
3 and an additional 2 
members in 2007.
4 
Nevertheless, a significant number of States were left outside this process. In terms of 
their individual or shared characteristics, these states can be placed into 3 main categories: 
•  Western  Balkans  (Croatia,  Montenegro,  Bosnia  &  Herzegovina,  Serbia, 
FYROM, Albania). 
•  Eastern Europe (former USSR) (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova). 
•  Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). 
While this categorization can be helpful in analyzing the  general features of these 
groupings, the level and instruments of cooperation with the EU varies significantly. 
  For example, Croatia  is a candidate and has already entered into accession 
negotiations with the EU since 2007, while Montenegro and Serbia are still waiting to acquire 
the status of a candidate state. Belarus never expressed its interest to become an EU member, 
while, on the other hand, Ukraine, which has also never applied for membership, waves a 
huge EU flag outside its Ministry of Foreign Affairs!! 
                                                
2   While the origins and development of such initiatives is not identical and, thus, they should not be equated 
with  each-other,  the  various  secessionist  movements  can  be  located  in  the  following  areas:  Nagorno 
Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Abkhazia & South Ossetia (Georgia), Transdniestria (Moldova), Chechnya (Russian 
Federation), Kosovo (Serbia). Additionally, other similar activities developed elsewhere, without however 
having serious implications on the territorial integrity of the respective States (eg. Tetovo in FYROM, Krajna 
& Eastern Slavonia in Croatia, Crimea in Ukraine, Adjara in Georgia, Gagauzia in Moldova).  
3   Estonia,  Lithuania  &  Latvia  from  the  former  USSR,  Slovenia  from  the  former  Yugoslavia,  Poland, 
Hungary, Czech Republic & Slovakia from the former communist eastern Europe, Cyprus and Malta. 
4   Bulgaria and Romania constituted the “Balkan” enlargement. The political decision for their accession was 
taken together with the other 10 states, but their actual entrance in the EU was postponed for 2007 or 2008 
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2.  EU POLICIES TOWARDS POTENTIAL CANDIDATES 
2.1 The Copenhagen criteria 
In response to the general trend of everybody joining the EU, even before its official 
creation in 1992, the EU leaders responded by establishing, in 1993,  a set of general criteria, 
applicable for every potential candidate, the so-called Copenhagen criteria
5 that would also 
serve as indicators for the progress of each candidate state. The criteria included economic, 
legislative and political factors.  
At the economic level, candidate states are required to have “… a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union”. 
At the legislative sphere, while it is not mentioned per se in the criteria, candidates 
must adhere to the volume of the EU  legislation, more commonly known as the “acquis 
communautaire”. The candidates are under an obligation to align their legislation with the EU 
before becoming eligible for membership. In the context of the 2004 / 2007 enlargement the 
acquis was divided into 31 negotiating chapters, while for the negotiations involving Croatia, 
Iceland and Turkey there are 35 chapters to be concluded. 
However, the most important category of the Copenhagen criteria are the political 
ones  which  require  candidate  states  to  achieve  “stability  of  institutions  guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”. The 
importance  of  these  criteria  is  that  they  are  purely  political  in  nature  and,  as  such,  the 
measurement  of  their  fulfillment  is  subjective,  dependent  on  the  various  political 
considerations of the EU and its members. Moreover, the subjective character of these criteria 
allows for a “flexible” application, without the EU being obliged to uphold certain standards. 
This became evident in the case of Turkey, which was allowed to start accession negotiations 
(in 2005), without having fulfilled the political criteria. 
 
2.2 The policies 
 
 a) Stabilization and Association Process 
The SAP was specifically designed to cover the needs of the Western Balkan States 
and drive them closer to the EU. It was initiated in 1999 through a German proposal for a 
Stability  Pact  for  the  states  of  the  Western  Balkans.  The  proposal  was  endorsed  by  the 
European Council and included a commitment – on behalf of the EU – that all of these states 
would  be  allowed  to  accede  to  the  EU.
6  The  European  Council  of  Thessaloniki  (2003) 
reaffirmed  this  commitment,
7  emphasizing  that  “The  European  Council  …  reiterated  its 
determination  to fully and  effectively support  the  European perspective  of  the  Western 
Balkan countries, which will become an integral part of the EU, once they meet the 
established criteria”.
8 
                                                
5   Conclusions of the Presidency - Copenhagen, June 21-22 1993, EU Doc. SN/180/1/93 Rev. 1, p. 13, § 7 (iii). 
6   “Common Position of 17 May 1999 concerning the launching of the Stability Pact of the EU on south-
eastern Europe”, 1999/345/CFSP, OJ L 133, 28.5.1999. 
7   Presidency Conclusions – Thessaloniki, June 19-20 2003, EU Doc. 11638/03, pp. 12-13. See also the EU-
Western Balkans Summit Declaration made by the EU Heads of States (EU Doc. 10229/03 (Presse 163), also 
available  at  http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/  accession_process/ 
how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/thessaloniki_summit_en.htm. 
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Unlike any other form of regional cooperation, the SAP has a well defined purpose 
which is to assist the recipient states in order to facilitate their accession process towards the 
EU. To this end, it is characteristic that while FYROM, and Croatia have already acquired the 
status of candidate states, their progress is still  being evaluated through the commitments 
contained in the individual SAAs.
9 
The areas of cooperation and funding covered by the SAP include the following: 
•  Trade concessions (autonomous trade measures).
10  
•  Economic and financial assistance. 
•  Assistance for reconstruction, development and stabilisation (CARDS)
11 which 
was replaced by the Instrument for pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) in 2007.
12 
•  Stabilisation  and  Association  Agreements  a  far-reaching  contractual 
relationship with the EU, entailing mutual rights and obligations. The SAAs incorporate most 
of the above mentioned measures, including the EU demands, as a “package deal”.
13 
Today, all of the Western Balkan states have concluded SAAs with the EU, however, 




2.3 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
 
2.3.1 Nature of the ENP 
 
The  nature  of  the  ENP  is  much  broader  than  the  SAP  both  in  scope  and  in  the 
geographical distribution of the recipient countries. It covers a wide area ranging from the 
North  African  States,  most  of  the  Middle  East,  the  Eastern  European  countries  and  the 
Caucasus, involving 15 states and the occupied Palestinian Territories.
15 For the purposes of 
                                                
9   See “Western Balkans: Enhancing the European Perspective” Communication from the Commission to the 
EP and the Council, EU Doc. COM (2008) 127 final/5.3.2008, esp. pp. 4-5. 
10   Trade concessions are explained by the EU Commission as “uniform system of trade preferences for the 
countries of the Western Balkans” providing duty-free access to the EU’s market of  virtually all goods, 
including (since 2001) agricultural products. See “The Stabilisation and Association process for South East 
Europe  Second  Annual  Report  -  Annex  1”,  Report  from  the  Commission,  EU  Doc.  COM  (2003)  139 
final/26.3.2003, esp. pp. 1-3. 
11  Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation, adopted by Council Regulation 
(EC) 2666/2000 of 5.12.2000 (OJ L 306, 7.12.2000, pp. 1-6.).  
12   In 2007 it was decided by the EU to replace the then existing funding schemes for the Western Balkans by a 
single instrument, the IPA which was established by Council Regulation (EC) 1085/2006 of 17.6.2006 (OJ L 
210, 31.7.2006, pp. 82-91). The implementing rules for the IPA are laid down in Commission Regulation 
(EC)  718/2007  of  12.6.2007  (OJ  L 170  of 29.6.2007, p.1),  which was amended  in  its  current form  by 
Commission Regulation (EU)  80/2010 of 28.1.2010 (OJ L 25 of 29.1.2010, pp. 1-9). 
13   For the nature and practical function of the SAAs see, inter alia, Cremona M.: State Aid Control: Substance 
and Procedure in the Europe Agreements and the Stabilisation and Association Agreements, 9 European Law 
Journal 265 (2003), pp. 266-271. 
14   The SAAs with FYROM, Croatia, Albania and Montenegro have already entered into force, while the SAAs 
with Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia are still in the process of ratification. For an overview of this process 
see the EU website on enlargement (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ potential-candidates/index_en.htm). 
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this presentation, the ENP will be analyzed only with regard to the Eastern European 
and the Caucasus countries. 
The ENP itself does not have a centralized or regional dimension but is based 
on bilateral agreements between the EU and each recipient state, which take the form 
of bilateral Action Plans.
16 According to one author, the ENP “… lies at the crossroads of the 
foreign, security, development, enlargement and trade policies of the EU”.
17 
It is true that the motives of the EU in launching and promoting the ENP cannot be 
summarized  in  a  single  title,  as  they  affect  many  policy  areas.  The  general  purpose  of 
surrounding the EU with friendly neighbours and avoiding new dividing lines,
18 as set out 
during the initiation of the ENP, while sounding very noble and idealistic, has very little to do 
with  the  actual  function  of  the  ENP,  which  has  been  specialized  to  include  security 
concerns,
19 political reforms and human rights,
20 as well as various trade and related issues. It 
also touches upon enlargement for certain states that could have a prospect of acceding to the 
EU (eg. Ukraine).  
For many, the ENP represents an alternative to full EU membership for states that 
were left out of the enlargement process, although it cannot be proclaimed as an ENP aim by 
the  EU  itself.
21  Chris  Patten,  former  external  relations  Commissioner  was  very  blunt  in 
expressing  this  view  by  stating  that  “over  the  past decade,  the  Union’s  most  successful 
foreign policy instrument has undeniably been the promise of EU membership. This is not 
sustainable. For the coming decade, we need to find new ways to export the stability, security 
and prosperity we have created within the enlarged Union”.
22 
 
                                                
16  Until now, 12 such Action plans have been concluded. The countries that have not yet agreed action plans 
with the EU are Belarus, Algeria, Syria and Libya. 
17   Lippert B.: The EU Neighbourhood Policy – Profile, Potential, Perspective, Intereconomics, July/August 
2007, pp. 180-190, at 180.  
18   These aims are set by Benita Ferrero-Waldner back in 2007, Commissioner for the ENP (2004-to date), in a 
characteristic article written in 2007 where she highlighted that “…  the idea was to deepen our relations 
with our neighbours and in so doing to encourage them to strengthen their own political and economic 
reforms. The EU’s neighbours are particularly important to the EU: by bolstering their stability, prosperity 
and security, we also bolster ours” (Ferrero-Waldner B.: ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy’, Baltic Rim 
Economies,  Vol.  6/2007,  p.  148  (http://www.tse.fi/FI/yksikot/ 
erillislaitokset/pei/Documents/bre/expert_article148_62007.pdf). 
19   See Dov Lynch: ‘The security dimension of the European neighbourhood’, 40 The International Spectator 33 
(2005), pp. 33-43. 
20   See  Kelley  J.:  New  Wine  in  Old  Wineskins:  Promoting  Political  Reforms  through  the  New  European 
Neighbourhood Policy, 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 29 (2006), pp. 29-55, esp. at. 40-41. 
21   Dannreuther  R.:  ‘Developing the  Alternative  to  Enlargement:  The  European Neighbourhood  Policy’,  11 
European Foreign Affairs Review 183 (2006), pp.183-201, at 188-190. See also a similar approach form the 
viewpoint  of  social  science  in  Lavenex  S.:  ’A  governance  perspective  on  the  European  neighbourhood 
policy: integration beyond conditionality?’, 15 Journal of European Public Policy 938 (2008), pp. 938-955. 
The article argues that ENP states could be allowed to participate in selected sectors of EU decision making 
processes, dependent on their own institutional capacity to cope with this challenge, as an alternative to full 
membership. 
22   Quoted  in  Commission  Communication:  “Wider  Europe–Neighbourhood:  Proposed  New  Framework  for 
Relations  with  the  EU’s  Eastern  and Southern  Neighbours”, EU  Doc.  IP/03/358,  11  March  2003,  p.  1 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/ 
358&format=HTML&aged=0&lg=lt&guiLanguage=en). Vassilios  Grammatikas 
 
2.3.2.  Practical function of the ENP 
The ENP is not a centralized process but takes the form of individual Action Plans 
which are mutually agreed between the EU and the respective states. 
The  Action  Plans  use  the  stick  and  carrot  method,  by  giving  significant 
incentives to the recipient state, in exchange for cooperation in various fields including 
security, political cooperation in combating large scale criminal activities that target 
the EU (eg. human trafficking, drugs, counterfeit) and, more importantly, political reforms 
and improvement of human rights. 
Among the incentives provided – on a case-by-case basis – we could highlight the 
following: 
•  Participation in parts of the internal market and the opportunity to take part in 
key EU policies and programmes. 
•  Upgraded political cooperation. 
•  Reduction of trade barriers and closer economic relations in general. 
•  Significant financial support. 
•  Participation  in  scientific,  cultural  &  educational  EU  programmes  (eg. 
ERASMUS Mundus). 
•  Support for legislative / administrative reforms to meet EU standards. 
Due to the case-by-case approach of the Action Plans, the above vary significantly 
from country to country, reflecting the different needs of the recipient on one hand and the 
varying levels of democracy, human rights and administrative convergence on the other hand, 
which require a different package of demands on behalf of the EU. 
 
2.4 Regional Policies 
 
The predominantly individualistic approach of the ENP Action Plans is supplemented 
by 3 regional policies, which were developed in parallel with the ENP concept, probably 
addressing problematic issues that were identified during the initial application of the ENP: 




2.4.1 Eastern Partnership 
 
This  initiative  was  undertaken  by  the  EU  in  2009,  after  a  joint  Polish  /  Swedish 
proposal,
24  in  response  to  the  complaints  by  several  Eastern  European  countries  that  the 
enhanced  cooperation  which  was  established  with  the  Mediterranean  countries  in  the 
framework of the Union for the Mediterranean, placed those countries in a more favourable 
position vis-à-vis the Eastern states.
25 The Partners are Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan. 
                                                
23  The presentation will refrain from analyzing the Union for the Mediterranean, as this initiative falls outside 
its geographical scope. 
24   For the launch of this initiative and the underlying reasons see Łapczynski M.: ‘The European Union’s 
Eastern Partnership: Challenges and Perspectives’, 3 Caucasian Review of International Affairs 142 (2009), 
pp. 142-155, esp. at 145-146. 
25  See Schäffer S. & Tolksdorf D.: ‘The Eastern Partnership – ENP plus for Europe’s eastern Neighbors’, 
C.A.Perspectives, Vol. 4, 2009, pp. 1-4, p.1, where the authors argue that the Eastern Partnership was created 
to “… counterbalance the Union of the Mediterannean”. The EU v. Balkan and Eastern European Countries: Unwelcome Neighbours or Potential Members? 
 
According to the EU, this initiative aims at “upgrading the level of engagement of the 
EU with the six partner countries in the East”,
26 building on and being complementary to 
existing bilateral instruments (ENP).
27  
For the implementation of the EaP the EU has allocated 600 million € for the period 
until 2013, a proportion of which is already being used in the framework of the ENP, and 
about 350 million € will be exclusively granted for the application of the EaP. The whole 
process  will  be  administered  through  the  ENPI,  which  is  already  in  use  as  the  single 
framework for the implementation of bilateral programmes under the ENP. 
As to the specific aims of the EaP, these are not very clear, especially when compared 
to  the  already  existing  ENP.  Several  academics  have  doubted  the  very  essence  of  this 
initiative
28 since it overlaps with the ENP to a large extent and the notion of “partnership”, 
since it is formed under the conditionality principle, thus leaving very little space for joint 
decision-making for the weaker part (the Eastern Countries).
29 
The  actual  “new”  or  “revised”  elements  that  the  EaP  adds  to  the  ENP  is  the 
multilateral  dimension  in  the  form  of  regular  meetings  and  joint  summits  between  EU 
representatives and the Eastern neighbours at the levels of heads of stets, foreign ministers, 
senior officials and experts. This multilateral cooperation is intended to support individual 
partner states’ efforts by providing a forum where they can share experience and information 
on the reforms pursued.
30 It also offers a new legal basis  for cooperation in the form of 
association agreements, which are supposed to take the cooperation a step further than the 
ENP Action plans.
31 
Moreover,  particular  emphasis  is  given  to  the  establishment  of  deep  and 
comprehensive free trade areas (DCFTA), the development of cooperation in the field of 
energy  security  and the efforts  towards  the  full liberalization of the  visa  regimes, which 
however is put strictly on a case-by-case basis, while the documents do not provide for an EU 
obligation to this effect. Additionally,  
As  far  as the EU  demands  are  concerned, the Eastern  Partners  are  required show 
progress in implementing such values as democracy, rule of law, upholding human rights and 
the implementation of the principles of market economy, sustainable development and good 
governance, as agreed in the Joint Declaration of the Prague Summit.  
Since the EaP is in the very first stages of implementation, it would be premature to 
assess its impact, although some initial signs from partner countries do not seem to be very 
                                                
26   European Commission, European External Action Service: Vademecum on Financing in the Frame of the 
Eastern Partnership, 24/09/2010, p. 3. (http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/ eap_vademecum_en.pdf). 
27   See Council of the EU: Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, EU Doc. 8435/09 
(Presse 78), 7.5.2009, p. 5. 
28   Van Vooren B.: “The EU as an International Actor and Progressive experimentation in its neighbourhood” in 
Koutrakos P. (ed.) : European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenam, 2011) p. 156. 
29   See  Korosteleva  E.:  ‘The  limits  of  EU  governance:  Belarus's  response  to  the European  Neighbourhood 
Policy', 15 Contemporary Politics 229 (2009), pp. 229-245, at. 242-243. 
30   Cichocki M.: “European Neighbourhood Policy or Neighbourhood Policies?” in Henderson K. & Weaver 
C. (eds.): The Black Sea Region and EU Policy: the Challenge of Divergent Agendas, (Ashgate Publishing, 
Farnham, 2010), p. 18 
31   See  Vojna  B.  &  Gniazdowski  M.(eds.):  Eastern  Partnership:  The  Opening  Report  (Polish  Institute  of 
International Affairs, Warsaw, 2009), p. 6. Vassilios  Grammatikas 
 
positive.
32 Additionally, Belarus is in essence left out of this process since it is offered 
merely  conditional  participation  on  the  technical  and  expert  levels  only,  because  of  its 
undemocratic regime and its unwillingness to promote democratic changes.
33 
Moreover, there should be a balance between the political considerations of individual 
EU member states or the EU itself towards the various partners. Thus, while the EU is –
correctly- exerting political  pressure on Belarus  by marginalizing it  in  the course of this 
process, it is blind on the Azeri regime, which is no better than its Belarussian counterpart in 
terms of political freedoms, democracy or human rights, or even the Georgian regime, which 
has gradually become highly undemocratic.    
It is submitted that, if the EaP is to have any meaningful content it should:  
(a) make a real difference or improvement from the current ENP scheme of cooperation,  
(b) become a truly multilateral form of cooperation and not a forum for the official expression 
of EU orders, which might be plausible to the smaller states but not to the bigger partners 
(Ukraine) and 
(c) offer incentives that actually appeal to the partner countries (eg. commitments on visa 
facilitation  or  even  abolition  regimes,  in  conjunction  with  common  border  monitoring, 
multilateral free trade agreements with concrete measures and deliverables). 
 
3. THE BLACK SEA SYNERGY 
 
  The Black Sea Synergy is a form of cooperation distinct from any other described 
above, as it originated from an initiative of the BSEC countries. In a joint statement in 2005,
34 
the Foreign Ministers of the BSEC envisaged closer cooperation between the EU and the 
BSEC.
35  After  the  necessary  negotiating  steps  were  taken,
36  the  Black  Sea  Synergy  was 
proclaimed in a joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the EU and the wider Black Sea 
Area in Kiev, on 14.2.2008.
37 
                                                
32  Since the initial stages of the EaP, Ukraine voiced its disappointment on the proposed EU-Ukraine agreement 
and displays, since, a constant fear that this initiative would become an alternative to full EU membership to 
which Ukraine is committed. (See  Eastern Partnership: The Opening Report, ibid., pp. 67-70, esp. p. 69). 
See also Giusti S. & Penkova T.: “EU Policy towards Ukraine and Belarus: Diverging Paths?” in Bindi F. 
(ed.): The foreign policy of the European Union: assessing Europe's role in the  world, (The Brookings 
Institution, Washington DC, 2010), pp. 136-137. 
33   Popielawska J.: “Eastern Partnership: The Polish Perspective” in Arvanitopoulos C. & Botsiou K.E. (eds.): 
The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2010 (Springer Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, 
2010)  p. 47. 
34   The Komotini Statement of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the BSEC, Komotini, Greece, 
23.4.2005.  (http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/declaration/ministerial/  Reports/AnnexVI-
KomotiniStatement%20Council%20final.pdf). 
35   The BSEC had set building an EU-BSEC economic area as a policy priority since 1999, but no major steps 
were taken until 2005. See Carr F. & Flenley P.: “Region Building in the Wider Black Sea Area” in  Volten 
P. & Tashev V. (eds.): Establishing Security and Stability in the Wider Black Sea Area: International Politics 
and the New and Emerging Democracies (IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2006), p. 43.  
36   In  April  2007  the  Commission  endorsed  the  idea  and  issued  a  communication  to  the  Council  and  the 
European Parliament entitled “Black Sea Synergy – A New regional Cooperation Initiative” (EU Doc. COM 
(2007) 160 final / 11.4.2007). After the initiation of the BSS, the Commission issued a new Communication 
marking one year from the launch of the initiative which, together with the latter document, constitute the 
institutional framework for the BSS (Communication to the Council and the European Parliament: Report on 
the first Year of Implementation of the Black Sea Synergy, EU Doc. COM (2008) 391 final / 19.6.2008). 
37  Text: http://eeas.europa.eu/blacksea/doc/joint_statement_blacksea_en.pdf. The EU v. Balkan and Eastern European Countries: Unwelcome Neighbours or Potential Members? 
 
  While the initiative came from within the BSEC organization and the participants were 
the BSEC countries, the Black Sea Synergy is not a bilateral cooperation scheme between two 
organizations, namely the EU and the BSEC, but rather refers to the wider Black Sea area as 
a  whole,  probably  to  have  a  broader  scope  and  a  more  flexible  decision  making 
process  involving  directly  the  partners  and  not  their  organizations,  which  would 
require  additional bureaucracy.  Another,  less  idealistic  explanation,  is  that  the  EU 
Commission did not want to grant the BSEC a preferential status as they considered 
that Russia was able to dominate and control the organization through the BSEC institutional 
consensus.
38 
  The  purpose  of  the  BSS  is  the  development of  cooperation  within  the  Black  Sea 
Region and also between the region as a whole and the European Union. Additionally, the 
participating states decided to promote region-wide activities. 
The  areas  of  cooperation  do  not  depart  significantly  from  the  other  initiatives. 
Emphasis  is  placed  on  environmental  issues,  energy,  transport,  education  and  research 
networks. The cooperation interacts with already existing projects in the respective areas (eg. 
TRACECA, INOGATE, Black Sea Commission). 
Funding  is  not  guaranteed  in  absolute  terms  as  in  the  case  of  the  EaP,  but  EU 
contribution will be available under the various ENPI programmes, as well as through the 
regional activities of the EBRD and EIB. 
 
3.1 BSS vs. EaP? 
 
  The EaP was launched almost in parallel with the BSS. On the positive side, it could 
be said that there is a firm commitment on behalf of the EU towards its eastern partners. 
However, we have at hand two initiatives with overlapping agendas and policy priorities.  
If the EU wishes to consider the EaP as a parallel process to the BSS, it should be 
made clear to which extent the two policies interact or complement each-other.
39 Otherwise, 
the  two  initiatives  are  doomed  to  fade  or  one  will  eventually  prevail  over  the  other, 
accompanied with the relevant implications on the side of the “looser”. Moreover, by not 
clarifying the scope, extent and complementarity of the two programmes, the EU seems to 
have acted without a specific plan or strategy, which is a common feature of its overall CFSP, 
but in this case the EU itself could be the victim by loosing its credibility in the eyes of its 
partners. 
  The  EU,  on  its  part,  is  trying  to  clarify  the  content  of  the  two  initiatives  by  its 
understanding  that  the  BSEC  aims  to  solve  problems  which  require  region-wide  efforts, 
having  the  Black  Sea  as  the  focal  point,  whereas  the  Eastern  Partnership  will  pursue 
alignment of partner countries with the EU and thus have Brussels as the centre of gravity. 
  The near future will show the level of success for the two processes, nevertheless, 
without steady and straight forward aims, which are attractive to the potential partners, it is 
doubtful whether many of the target states will be willing to grant the EU the status of a 
“colonial power” over their political, economic and human rights standards, especially when 
the most powerful policy instrument the EU has applied so far – the potential of accession – is 
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Policy Studies, Brussels, 2009), p. 20. 
39   See  Tsantoulis  Y.:  Black  Sea  Synergy  and  Eastern  Partnership:  Different  Centres  of  Gravity, 
Complementarity or Confusing Signals?, ICBSS, Policy Brief, No.12, February 2009, p. 5. Vassilios  Grammatikas 
 
already missing  in  most of  the  cases. As  it  was  pointed out by  Karen  Smith  “A  clearer 
incentive structure, attached to clearer and well-ordered priorities, would give the EU 
better tools for fostering fundamental reform in the Neighbours”.
40 
 
4.    THE EU - RUSSIA RELATIONS 
A separate, and probably the most important chapter in the relationship between the 
EU  and  its  Eastern  neighbours,  refers  to  its  relations  with  the  Russian  Federation. 
Neighbouring a superpower – or former superpower – cannot be easy, especially when the EU 
has aspirations of playing a similar role in the global arena and Russia strives to restore its 
former position. 
Nevertheless, the two parties are indispensable to each-other, at least economically. 
Trade and energy relations form a cornerstone in the EU – RF relationship, with the EU being 
by far the largest export market for Russia, while RF is the 3
rd biggest EU’s trade partner. In 
particular, Russian oil and – mainly – gas supplies to the EU amount to a large percentage of 
Russia’s exports in Europe, whilst more than 50% of the supplied gas is Russian and more 
than 80% of the gas supplied flows through Russian pipelines.
41 
 
4.1.   The institutional framework   
  The institutional relationship between RF and EU started in 1994 with the conclusion 
of a comprehensive Partnership Agreement between the RF and the EU and the RF and the 
individual member states, which entered into force in 1997.
42  Among the many sectors of 
cooperation established by the Partnership Agreement, particular reference should be made to 
the following: 
•  Economic cooperation, aiming at the expansion of their respective economies, covering 
inter alia (Art. 56):  
o  development of their respective industries and transport, 
o  exploration of new sources of supply and of new markets, 
o  encouragement of technological and scientific progress, 
o  encouragement of a stable social and human resources development and of local 
employment development, 
o  promotion  of  the  regional  cooperation  with  the  aim  of  its  harmonious  and 
sustainable development. 
•  Energy (Art. 65), which includes: 
o  improvement of the quality and security of energy supply, in an economic and 
environmentally sound manner, 
o  formulation of energy policy, 
o  improvement in management and regulation of the energy sector in line with a 
market economy, 
o  the  introduction  of  a  range  of  institutional,  legal,  fiscal  and  other  conditions 
necessary to encourage increased energy trade and investment, 
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757-773,  p. 773. 
41   The interdependence of the two parties in their energy relations was highlighted in the context of the 4
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Permanent Partnership Council on Energy by the participating officials at the ministerial level (EU Doc. 
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o  modernization of energy infrastructure including interconnection of gas supply and 
electricity networks, 
o  the environmental impact of energy production, supply and consumption, in order 
to prevent or minimize the environmental damage resulting from these activities, 
•  Customs (Art. 78), according to which the overall aim will be “… to achieve compatibility 
of the customs systems of the Parties” (Art. 78 § 1), with particular emphasis given to 
(Art. 78 § 2): 
o  the exchange of information, 
o  the improvement of working methods, 
o  the harmonization and simplification of customs procedures regarding the goods 
traded between the Parties, 
o  the interconnection between the transit systems of the Community and Russia, 
o  the support in the introduction and management of modern customs information 
systems, including computer-based systems on the customs check points, 
o  mutual assistance and joint actions  with respect to 'dual-use` goods and goods 
subject to non-tariff limitations. 
At the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to reinforce 
their cooperation by creating four ‘common spaces’ in the framework of the Partnership and 
Cooperation  Agreement  and  on  the  basis  of  common  values  and  shared  interests.  These 
common spaces are the following: 
1. The Common Economic Space, covering economic issues and the environment; 
2. The Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; 
3. The  Common  Space  of  External  Security,  including  crisis  management  and  non-
proliferation; 
4. The Common Space of Research and Education, including Cultural Aspects. 
The Moscow Summit in May 2005 adopted Road Maps to act as the short and medium 
term instruments for the implementation of the four Common Spaces. According to the EU 
Commission: “these build on the on-going cooperation as described above, set out further 
specific objectives, and specify the actions necessary to make the common spaces a reality. 
They  thereby  determine  the  agenda  for  cooperation  between  the  EU  and  Russia  for  the 
medium-term”.
43 
The  above  could  be  the  description  of  the  perfect  relationship  between  two 
neighbours, however the reality is slightly different. As far as the partnership is concerned, it 
expired  in 2007  and  since  then the  EU  and  RF  are  negotiating  the  conclusion  of  a  new 
Partnership, without succeeding until now. 
The  much  advertised  “common  spaces”  do  not  seem  to  provide  a  real  policy 
instrument as their implementation until now is far from being satisfactory.
44   
 
4.2. Problems between RF and EU / EU members 
The EU- RF relationship is influenced by issues of a predominantly bilateral nature 
between the  RF and certain EU countries. While the  general relations with the ‘old’ EU 
members can be characterized as constructive – at least – this is not always the case with 
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some  of  the  ‘new’  members.  Certain  states,  namely  Poland  and  Lithuania
45  and,  more 
recently, Estonia, display an open animosity towards Russia, which is evident in practically 
every level of EU policy making, but has also been evident in some bilateral issues that arose 
with Russia, the most important of which were the Russian import ban on Polish agricultural 
products (2005-2008)
46 and the Estonian Monument Crisis (2007).
47 
More generally, certain authors have attributed the initiation of the EaP as an effort of 
the ‘new’ Europe, together with some Scandinavians, to push for a new policy that  goes 
contrary  to  the  French-German  policies  towards  Russia.  The  following  passage  is 
characteristic  of  this  trend:  “Russia  and  its  Western  “protectors”  are  already  sounding 
alarms that the new Ostpolitik of the Scandinavians and the “New Europeans” undermines 
the Russo-centric” policies of France and Germany. They are right to sound the alarm. The 
new policy does threaten their cozy arrangement. Sooner or later, “old Europe” will have to 
come up with a policy that accounts for Russia’s true national interests, rather than the 
corporate interests of the thin stratum of the ruling elite in Moscow”.
48 
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46   In 2005 the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance banned a wide range of 
meat imports from Poland, which was supplemented by a ban on plant products. Initially Poland sought to 
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human consumption. Despite some Russian concerns that even the EU officials considered legitimate, the 
rapid lift of the sanctions indicates that the problem was more of a political nature, having to do with the 
overall Polish foreign policy as a key US ally in the area (Roth M.: Bilateral Disputes between EU Member 
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enable the relocation of the monument sparked fierce reactions in Moscow where Russian politicians spoke 
about a blasphemous act and glorification of fascism, including the week long  blockade of the Estonian 
embassy  in  Moscow  by  protesters  and  the  extensive  cyber-attack  on  Estonian  government  websites. 
Eventually, the Estonian government requested the intervention of the EU, with the German Presidency 
undertaking efforts to restore bilateral talks between Estonian and Russian officials to resolve the issue. The 
EU  took  part  in  the crisis  only with  regard  to  the  siege  of  the  Estonian embassy  by  adopting  a  CFSP 
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Convention on Diplomatic Relations, emphasizing however that “Given the emotionally charged atmosphere 
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matter” (http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/CFSP_Statements/May/ 0502BoEstland.html). In this case, the EU 
clearly displayed its solidarity to Estonia, but only with regard to the siege of the embassy, without taking 
parts on the substance of the issue. (Roth, ibid. pp. 13-15). 
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Others point at the trend of Moscow to destroy any multilateral initiative in the region 
and, thus, suggesting its exclusion from the EaP or other similar initiatives!!!
49  
The 2008 conflict in Georgia also complicated the relation between EU and RF, but it 
was probably fortunate for the EU that the Presidency was held by France at the time, and, 
through the own political agenda of its President, Sarkozy, the EU managed to appear as a 
credible third party which pushed for an agreement
50 and today, almost 3 years later, that 
incident hasn’t seriously harmed the EU – RF relations. 
Another, more delicate matter that also touches upon the core of EU external security 
policy is the issue of Kalinigrad, the Russian exclave that has access to the Baltic, but not to 
Russia or Belarus, since it borders Lithuania and Poland. On the other hand, the Schengen 
treaty provides for very strict rules of monitoring of the external frontiers of the EU, including 
the visa regime. Therefore, for the first time, Russian citizens would be required to issue visas 
in order to travel to Russia.
51  
Russia has repeatedly made it clear that free access of the residents of Kalinigrad to 
Russia is a top priority in its future relationship with the EU. After a series of negotiations the 
parties concluded in 2002 a Joint Statement on the use of FTD (Facilitated Travel Document) 
and  FTRD  (Facilitated  Rail  Travel  Document),
52  however  it  is  clear  that  this  temporary 
solution is hardly satisfactory for Russia, since the issue reappears from time to time with 
Russia demanding the abolition of any form of visa on a permanent basis.
53 
 
5. BEYOND ENLARGEMENT 
After this concise analysis of the relations between the EU and its Balkan & Eastern 
neighbourhood the question, the main question arising is what happens next or in more blunt 
terms, how will the EU react to deal with poor, unstable and problematic neighbours that keep 
knocking on its door? Since the cases are different there is not a single response to be given.  
As far as Russia is concerned, it never expressed its desire to ever become an EU 
member. Understandably so, because it would almost be the same, as if the US applied for EU 
membership. Therefore the EU needs to formulate a sincere and comprehensive cooperation 
with Russia as it can only be mutually profitable for both. 
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With  regard  to  the  Western  Balkans,  the  EU  has  promised  them  accession,  thus, 
sometime it has to deliver. However, this is not automatic or self evident in this particularly 
volatile  region  which,  so far  sparked  the  1
st  World  War and became  the  Theater  for  the 
bloodiest conflict in Europe since WW II. When Croatia started its accession negotiations 
(2007), the more optimistic view foresaw accession by 2011 at the most. It seems it will take 
much longer…  
Serbia also presents a very difficult puzzle for the EU, especially with regard to the 
Kosovo issue. As any legal solution to the problem is very far away, since it is doubtful 
whether  Serbia  will  ever  accept  the  independence  of  Kosovo,  Serbia  could  become  a 
candidate country and potentially a full member, a territory of which is already recognized as 
independent by 22 EU members.  
Bosnia  &  Herzegovina is  practically  an  EU  ‘colony’  since  it  applies  the  ultimate 
political and military control, however, even the enforcement of the SAA proved to be very 
difficult.  Moreover,  it  is  an  artificially  created  state  and  its  preservation  as  such  solely 
depends on the will of the –so called – international community and at this stage the EU, to 
uphold it, since the constituent entities, more explicitly the Serbs but also the Croats have 
repeatedly expressed their will to break away. 
FYROM has the bilateral problem with Greece, concerning its name and the historical 
usurpation of the ancient Macedonian history and, given the unwillingness of its leadership to 
compromise with Greece, its path towards the EU also seems doomed. 
Albania has a fragile political system and its economic data bring it decades behind 
any acceptable EU standards. 
In the face of the above, does the EU have the capacity to inherit and solve these 
issues? The answer is that it has to, not for moral reasons, but to ensure its own security and 
prosperity by incorporating a European area that if left aside it could become a magnet for all 
forms of organized crime. Can the EU perform this task? Very doubtful, especially if we look 
upon the initial responses to the Yugoslav crisis which, instead of uniting the EU states in a 
common foreign policy to resolve the issue, they reacted by “Balkanizing” their own foreign 
policies (mainly Germany and France).  
With regard to the rest of the Eastern partners, the ENP and the EaP do not seem to 
have a clear  vision as to the specific targets and deliverables. Specifically  in the case of 
Ukraine,  the  approach  until  now  proved  to  be  very  unsatisfactory  for  the  Ukrainian 
leadership,  which  has  a  very  clear  policy  towards  EU  accession.  While  the  current  EU 
policies tend to invite Ukraine “with us” it is clear that Ukraine wants to become “one of us”. 
Therefore,  also  because  of  its  size  and  economic  importance,  any  alternative  to  full 
membership is doomed to fail in the long term. 
Probably  the  rest  of  the  Eastern  partners  cannot  demand  membership  or  it  is 
unrealistic for some of them (eg. Azerbaijan) but even if they are to be satisfied with a kind of 
“special  relationship”  this  has  to  be  clear  and  attractive.  The  unwillingness  or  even  the 
incompetence  of  the  EU  to  display  such  clarity  in  its  intentions  will  undoubtedly  have 
negative impact in its relations with those states, as well as its credibility as a world player.  
 